Abstract -Alert fusion is a promising research area in information assurance today. To increase trustworthiness in systems, most modern information systems deployed in distributed environments employ multiple, diverse sensors that monitor security violations throughout the network The outputs of the sensors must be fused in an effective and intelligent manner in order to provide an overall view of the status of such systems. A unified architecture for intelligent alert fusion will essentially combine alert prioritization, alert clustering and alert correlation. In this paper, we address the alert clustering aspect of sensor data fusion in an intrusion detection environment. A causal knowledge based inference technique with fuzzy cognitive modeling is used to cluster alerts by discovering structural relationships in sensor data.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Information assurance is viewed as the perception that systems are operating as required -with expected protection of the availability, confidentiality and integrity of information within the systems. In order to maintain trust in systems, mechanisms are deployed that monitor any violation of such perception. Intrusion detection systems (IDS)s have been extensively used by researchers and practitioners to maintain trustworthiness in systems. An IDS closely monitors systems and their networks for any sign of probable security violations and then reports alerts to an appropriate authority. Additionally, defense-in-depth strategies suggest that multiple IDSs/sensors should exist in a protected system -all reporting on the security health of the system and/or network.
Research in IDS improvement has taken on new challenges in the past few years. One such contemporary and promising approach in this area is alert fusion in a multisensor environment. Increased demands for "more trustworthy" systems and the fact that a single sensor cannot detect all types of misuse/anomalies have prompted most modem information systems to employ multiple, diverse sensors. Intelligent sensor fusion of runtime behavior data is critical for such systems to obtain a holistic notion of a complex systems' runtime status. Therefore, the outputs of sensors must be fused in an effective and intelligent manner in order to provide an overall view of the status of a distributed system. [13] . Also, a multitier sensor fusion method is used for complementary sensor corroboration, which is particularly suitable in the high performance cluster environment. In this paper, the alert clustering aspect of sensor data fusion in distributed environment is addressed. A causal knowledge based inference technique with fuizzy cognitive modeling is used to cluster alerts by discovering feature similarities in sensor data. The following sections will briefly outline some related research, provide necessary background information for this research, describe the technique used in multi-level alert clustering, report on some preliminary results on a benchmark dataset and lastly conclude.
II. RELATED WORK
Research in the area of alert clustering emerged in the last few years and primarily concerns information modeling and high level reasoning. Among them, the ones that are relevant to our work are the following.
One of the early research efforts in this area was led by Debar and Wespi [4] . In this work the authors introduced the concept of "Aggregation and Correlation Component" (ACC) , which analyze and correlate alerts generated by IDSs using an expert rule-based system. ACCs look for aggregation relationships between alerts by grouping together alerts based on common characteristics. With three aggregation axes, seven different situations can be aggregated. In the French Defense Agency's MIRADOR project [2] , one of the functions of a co-operation module between multiple IDSs is alert clustering. The co-operation module is an expert rulebased system that supports logical reasoning with predicate logic. In this system, alert clustering refers to finding similarity of new alerts to existing alerts in a knowledge repository. Alert similarity is determined by the similarity requirements specified by expert rules which are domain specific and defined by examination of prior alerts generated by the IDSs. "Probabilistic alert correlation" finds similarity between alerts that match closely, if not exactly [15] . In this clustering approach, a repository of meta-alerts constructed using expert knowledge and prior alerts from heterogeneous sensors, is maintained for similarity matching with alerts reported. The clustering scheme uses similarity functions to measure the closeness of each feature pair. Construction of similarity functions to measure feature similarity is based on combination of expert rule-base and Bayes formalism. Dain [13] . Alert clustering involves grouping or merging together "similar" alerts such that common generic attacks on systems can be discovered. In exact approaches, common feature values between two alerts are compared for a perfect match in order to consider them identical alerts. Alerts are considered to belong to the same cluster/group if they have common attribute values for different features like source, target, time, attack, service, and user. But often in real situations, the notion of similarity is not clear-cut but involves a certain degree of likelihood. We address alert clustering based not only on exact matches of attribute values but also on close or inexact matches of attribute values by incorporating the approximate nature of fuzzy logic for defining similarity between alerts.
Soft computing differs from hard computing by accommodating tolerance for impreciseness, uncertainty and partial truth. Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs), which originated from the synergism of fuzzy logic and neural networks, is such an efficient soft computing tool [14] .
Professor Bart Kosko of the University of Southern California extended the cognitive maps (signed digraphs of nodes and edges) to fizzy cognitive maps by considering the fuzzy aspects of causality and by accommodating the knowledge-base building property [7] .
FCMs model the world as concepts and causal relations between concepts in a structured collection [7, 8, 9] . Concepts (nodes) in an FCM are events that originate in the system and whose values can change over time. The causality links between concepts are represented by directed edges that denote how much one concept impacts the other(s). The concepts in the FCMs can be crisp sets or fuzzy sets defined by fuzzy membership functions [9] . Concepts typically take values in the interval [0, 1] . In the simplest case, a concept is either on (1) or off (0). A concept can also be represented by a fuzzy set and can fire to some degree. The edges typically have values between 0 and 1 or -l and 1. Edges can also be fuwzzy, and in those cases we can use linguistic words such as, "a little," "very," "somewhat," to represent the edges. When the edges between concepts are fuzzy values, fuzzy set operators like T-norms and T-conorms can be applied to the particular chain of concepts to infer the total effects of concepts in the chain [7] . flow between the concept nodes Ci and Cj [7] . An [12] for fusing alert information in a multi-sensor intrusion detection environment to assess network health. Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine, a network based IDS, also use FCMs in detecting attacks from features extracted from network traffic [16] . The work that we present in this paper differs from our previous work [12] primarily in the focus of the research, which is discovery of structural relationships between alerts accommodating inexact matching in feature attributes. The fusion model considers similarity notion in terms of category/class/type matching at different levels of abstraction using generalization hierarchy of feature attributes. A generalization hierarchy represents a hierarchy formed by the generalization relationships of a set of attributes. Fig. 3 shows a generalization hierarchy for attack names. Using such generalization hierarchy, specific attack names can be generalized to categories of attacks at different abstraction levels and such abstraction enables the fusion model to find similarity between two attacks with different attack names.
III. MULTI-LEVEL ALERT
For example, at level 4 (most specific) of the generalization hierarchy, two attacks ffbconfig and fdfornatt may seem different but both of them can be generalized to the "Privilege Violation" category at level 3 and therefore can be considered similar at that level. Again for two seemingly
Attacks associated with root-owned ffbconfig and fdformat utility programs to gain root privilege. different attacks dictionaryl and fjbconfig, the fusion model can find similarity between them at level 2, as both can be generalized to the "Access Control Violation" category. Clearly, alerts found to match at level 3 should be considered more similar than those that match at level 2. To capture this notion of similarity being directly associated with the level of abstraction hierarchy, the fusion model uses distance between abstraction levels to compute the feature similarity. In this respect, the fusion model uses abstraction lattices for alert features with distance scores as shown in fig. 4 To illustrate, suppose two alerts have the same IP address, which will yield an exact match and a similarity score of 4 for the source feature. But, suppose two alerts are from different sources and hence do not have the same IP address. In that case, the fusion model generalizes them at different abstraction levels to see if any match can be found at the higher levels of abstraction. Suppose the two alerts are found to be generated from sources at the same subnet, then the source feature similarity would have a score of 3. If they matched at only type level (e.g., sources with same class A type address), then the similarity score given would be 1. Using such distance score for similarity measurement enables the fusion model to give higher similarity scores to matches at more specific levels and lower similarity scores to matches at more generalized levels, i.e., higher score designate more similar alert features and vice versa.
For each resource in the network, the fusion model generates different types of similar alert clusters according to different combinations of attribute generalization (Table I) . SimBir-Sourc_Similsr_Attack_Similar_Tim, C,
S0m1. r-Sourc-Some-Timc_Sisailsr Attack, C,, The cluster in the last row of Table I employs exact reasoning and does not allow any deviations or generalization.
In the columns under source, attack and time, S denotes specific or exact matching, G denotes matching with generalization. When an alert generated for a particular resource (target) becomes a candidate for a cluster, the score it contributes to the support of the cluster is computed by combining the similarity scores for all features. The Max column in Table I represents the maximum score an alert can contribute in this respect and the Min column represents the minimum score. Intuitively the scores denote the degree to which an alert belongs to a specific alert cluster or group.
To illustrate, suppose X is an alert that is a candidate of the cluster Similar Source_Same Attack Same_Time. For this particular cluster to activate, the attack and time attributes have to be same and as deviations are only tolerated for the attribute source -only it can be generalized. The similarity score will be 4 (distance score of most specific level) for each of attack and time attributes (4+4=8 for both) and the similarity score will vary from 1 to 3 -from least to more specific (it won't be 4 as it is not same/exact) for the source attribute. Therefore, for this particular cluster, an alert can contribute candidacy scores in the range of 9 (8+1=Max.
Value) to 11 (8+3=Min. Value) (7h row from the top in Table   I ). Depending on the abstraction level used in similarity matching, an alert's candidacy score can vary on a scale between 3 to 12 for the clusters in Table I . The fusion model ftizzifies the crisp score by mapping it to a fuzzy variable with a normalized range of 0 to 1. Fig. 5 shows the complete term set of the fuzzy variable "candidacy score," superimposed on the score distribution data for the clusters in Table I . It should be made clear that the fusion model only considers an alert to be a member of one and only one cluster. Although the cluster definition allows one alert to be a member of several clusters, for simplification purposes, the fusion model does not allow such overlapping and consider an alert's candidacy for the most specific cluster found.
Being a resource centric model, the fusion model seeks out suspicious clusters activated for each resource in the system. Different types of alert clusters are generated according to different combinations of the features and feature similarities. The strength of a particular alert cluster depends on the "closeness" of all contributing alerts in generating the cluster. The strength of a cluster activated for a particular resource is computed as an average of the fuwzzy candidacy scores of all the contributing alerts. I.e., for each alert, Ai that contributes to a cluster Cj, the cluster strength of Cj, i.e., S(Cj) is denoted by:
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In order to compute the individual cluster strengths and also to fuse the overall impact of the activated clusters on each resource, the resemblance between FCMs and neural networks is utilized [1] . In the neural network approach, the concepts of the FCM are represented by neurons and the edges are represented by the weights of the connecting neurons. The "'cluster" concepts in the FCMs, treated as neurons, triggers activation of the alert levels with different weights depicting impact between them. An adjacency matrix is used to list these cause and effect relationships between the FCM concepts. In an FCM, the runtime operation is observed by determining the value of the effect/output concept from the cause/input concepts and the connecting edge values. The evidences of different clusters generated for a particular resource is fused to compute their collective effect by considering their impacts. The overall effect of suspicious clusters activated for a particular resource is denoted by the resource's cluster association strength (CAS). At any time, CAS for any particular resource will collectively represent the effects of all the suspicious clusters activated for that resource at that time. The FCM in fig. 6 denotes how the different clusters generated affect the overall cluster association strength of a resource. The impact levels are different depending on the nature of the cluster. More specific clusters cause more impact on the resource than less specific ones according to which abstraction level was used for generalization. Therefore, it will always be that 14>13>12>11.
The impact values are determined by using the maximum fuzzy candidacy score for each cluster. The CAS of a resource Ri at t0,+1 time for each contributing cluster Ck with impact IE, can be represented as the following:
It should be pointed out that CAS can be considered a confidence score given by the fusion model to represent the degree of concern for a particular resource in its involvement in identical attack trends. Telnet Terminal Type, and Telnet Env All. Although the alert names do not match at the specific level, both of these alerts indicate that sensitive information related to host tenrninal has been communicated and thus can be generalized to the same abstract alert type. Therefore, it makes sense to find similarity between them at the particular abstraction level.
Along with identifying same/similar clusters, the fusion model reported degrees of extent of the concerned hosts' involvement in such clusters or common attack patterns. In the example shown in Table II , the overall cluster association strength reported for host mill was: 72.03%. The highest cluster association strength (85.01%) was reported for another victim host locke (IP: 172.016.112.010). This is due to the fact that for this particular host, the alerts grouped together required least effort in generalization to find matching. This supports the notion that higher cluster association strength indicates the presence of more specific alert clusters for a particular host and lower cluster association strength indicates presence of more generalized alert clusters.
The above represents only partial results from the preliminary experiments we conducted. The results of the experiments show potential for the multi-level alert clustering approach. Currently, we are in the process of conducting more experiments and refining the clustering technique. We expect to achieve improved results and will report the results in future publications. The limitations of this approach include mapping requirement of sensor alert types into generalization hierarchy. Although our approach requires knowledge of attack behavior in terms of its impact, the use and encoding of this knowledge is straightforward. We have found FCMs to be particularly suitable in dynamic environment as they are flexible enough to capture adaptive nature of human knowledge.
Our ongoing research concentrates on developing a unified alert fusion model which will combine alert prioritization, alert clustering and alert correlation in a single framework and can be used to provide a security administrator with a better overall understanding of the health of the system resources. Also, we are developing a model that will be suitable for a high performance computing cluster
